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Abstract
Consensus monetary business cycle theory is hardly able to rationalize why …scal
policy is repeatedly found to stimulate private consumption and why monetary pol-
icy should care about Ricardian …scal policy. In this paper we demonstrate that this
changes when government bonds provide liquidity services. We develop a simple
business cycle, which can be solved analytically, where money is supplied via open
market operations. When only government bonds are accepted as a collateral for
money and private debt earns a higher interest, real public debt eases households’
access to money and Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Interest rate policy is
not restricted by requirements for equilibrium determinacy and its e¤ects are con-
sistent with common priors. Shocks are propagated via changes in …nancial wealth
and persistence is altered by the stance of …scal and monetary policy. Government
expenditures, which are not completely tax …nanced, can raise private consumption
when monetary policy is not too reactive. Similarly, a moderate interest rate policy
allows a de…cit …nanced tax cut to stimulate real activity.
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Consensus monetary business cycle theory, i.e., the New Keynesian theory or the New Neo-
classical Synthesis, has evidently proven its usefulness for monetary policy analysis (see, e.g.,
Clarida et al., 1999, or, Woodford, 2002). However, it leaves some open questions, or, puzzles,
in particular with regard to the e¤ects of …scal policy measures and interactions thereof with
monetary policy. Empirical evidence, for example, indicate that government spending is able
to cause a surge in private consumption (see, Fatas and Mihov, 2001, and Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002), whereas the consensus model can at most generate a rise in total aggregate
demand (see Canzoneri et al., 2002a, or, Linnemann and Schabert, 2003). It also lacks any
mechanism by which a de…cit …nanced tax cut can lead to a real expansion as, e.g., found by
Mountford and Uhlig (2002). Furthermore, a Ricardian …scal policy regime is irrelevant for
price stability and equilibrium determinacy (see Woodford, 2002), such that the consensus
framework cannot provide a rationale for high …scal responsiveness as, for example, demanded
by the stability and growth pact.
The main source for these shortcomings is the validity of Ricardian equivalence, which
hardly allows for substantial …scal policy e¤ects. As a promising alternative Leith and Wren-
Lewis (2000) and Chadha and Nolan (2002) develop a business cycle framework with over-
lapping generations. Given that Ricardian equivalence does not hold, they show that the
interaction of monetary and …scal policy can be particularly relevant for macroeconomic sta-
bility and for determinacy. In this paper we develop a novel approach based on the role
of government bonds for money supply, i.e., in open market operations. In particular, we
identify cases where open market operations are relevant and demonstrate that allowing for
government bonds to provide liquidity services can help solving the aforementioned puzzles.2
For this we develop a model where the central bank supplies money via open market oper-
ations, or, to be more precisely, via repurchase agreements, while money demand is induced
by a cash-in-advance constraint. Households do not carry over money from one period to the
other and the so-called Hahn (1965) paradox, i.e., the puzzle about how to guarantee that
money has a positive value over a …nite horizon, is resolved by settlement of repurchase agree-
ments similar to the approach of Drèze and Polemarchakis (2000) and Bloise et al. (2002).
Households’ …nancial wealth comprises private debt and government bonds; only the latter
are accepted in exchange for money in repurchase agreements. When government bonds earn
a lower interest than private debt, agents care about open market operations and government
bonds provide liquidity services. To facilitate comparisons with related studies, we assume
that the central bank sets the discount (repo) rate, which equals the interest rate on treasury
bills, contingent on current in‡ation, and that …rms set prices in a staggered way.
The model exhibits two fundamentally di¤erent versions, depending on whether open
2Recently, Canzoneri and Diba (2000) have shown that the price level indeterminacy problem can be solved
by allowing for liquidity services of bonds.
1market operations matter or not.3 In the latter case the model is isomorphic to the consensus
New Keynesian model. Herein, money supply is de facto unrestricted and monetary policy has
a bearing on prices and on real activity by shifting the real interest rate such that households
are willing to intertemporally substitute consumption and leisure. Ricardian equivalence
holds such that government …nancing is irrelevant for the allocation and monetary policy is
responsible for macroeconomic stability (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 1999, or, Woodford, 2001).
In the case where agents care about open market operations the monetary stance depends
on the nominal interest rate and on the stock of government bonds outstanding. Changes
of the former immediately a¤ects money supply and, thus, private consumption, while the
consumption Euler equation residually determines the interest rate on private debt.4 Fiscal
policy alters the monetary stance as real public debt eases households’ access to cash via
open market operations. In contrast to the former version, the equilibrium sequence of real
…nancial wealth, which serves as an endogenous state variable, a¤ects private consumption
and in‡ation, and Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Furthermore, real wealth exerts an
stabilizing impact on the economy such that interest rate policy must not be restricted to
guarantee a stable and uniquely determined equilibrium path.
The simple structure of the model allows to analytically derive the local determinacy
properties and the state space representation facilitating a straightforward analysis of interest
rate, government spending, and tax cut shocks. When open market operations are relevant
such that government bonds provide transaction services, …scal policy interacts with monetary
policy and our model is able to overcome the shortcomings of the consensus model mentioned
above. Innovations to the discount rate alters money supply, in‡ation, and, by rigid prices,
real activity qualitatively consistent with, e.g., Clarida et al.’s (1999) New Keynesian model.
In contrast to models of the latter type, real …nancial wealth is a relevant state variable and
can induce impulse responses not to die out immediately after a shock disappears. While a
more reactive interest rate policy lowers the persistence, the latter is shown to rise for higher
degrees of …scal responsiveness. Turning to the e¤ects of …scal policy measures, it is further
shown that the sign of the responses, in particular for private consumption and output,
crucially rely on the structural part of …scal and monetary policy. Regarding the e¤ects
of an unexpected rise in public consumption, the model generates essentially neoclassical
e¤ects in the case where government expenditures are predominantly tax …nanced. When,
on the other hand, the portion of public consumption …nanced by debt is su¢ciently large
and interest rate policy is moderate, private consumption can actually rise as, e.g., found by
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Moreover, a de…cit …nanced tax cut raises the in‡ation rate
as well as real wealth, and can stimulate real activity, as reported by Mountford and Uhlig
(2002), when interest rate policy is not too aggressive. Otherwise, interest rate adjustments
3This question has already been discussed by Sargent and Wallace (1982) and Smith (1988).
4The latter feature is in fact consistent with Canzoneri et al.’s (2002b) empirical …ndings, which cast servere
doubts on the central role of the consumption Euler equation for the transmission of interest rate policy.
2triggered by higher in‡ation can lead to a contractionary monetary stance which prevails over
expansionary …scal policy measures.
The remainder is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop a sticky price model with
repurchase agreements. Section 3 provides the linear approximation to the model for two
versions di¤ering in whether open market operation are relevant or not. In section 4 we
derive the solution for the former version and examine monetary and …scal policy e¤ects
herein. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Timing of events At the beginning of a period, households are endowed with government
bonds and claims on other households carried over from the previous period. There are three
sources of aggregate uncertainty: a monetary policy shock, a government spending shock and
a tax cut shock. After these shocks arrived, goods are produced, and factor remunerations
are credited at a …nancial intermediary.5 Then asset markets open, where households can
adjust bond holdings and borrow (lend) from (to) other households. Given that purchases of
consumption goods are restricted by a liquidity constraint, households are willing to acquire
cash. The central bank is assumed to supply money exclusively via open market operations,
i.e., via repurchase agreements. Households carry over a certain amount of interest bearing
assets Bc to the …nancial intermediary, which engages in repurchase agreements on the behalf
of the households. The central bank supplies money M to an amount equal to the value of
households’ securities discounted by the nominal interest rate i : M = Bc=(1 + i).T h e n
the goods market opens, where households purchase consumption goods from …rms. Their
cash earnings are then paid to the owners (households), transferred to the intermediary, and
repurchased by the central bank.
Households Lower (upper) case letters denote real (nominal) variables. The time index is
dropped to denote steady state values. There is a continuum of identical and in…nitely lived
households of mass one. At the beginning of period t, the representative household’s …nancial
wealth At¡1 comprises government bonds Bt¡1 and private debt Dt¡1 holdings, At¡1 =
Bt¡1 + Dt¡1, carried over from the previous period. Before the goods market opens, the
household enters the asset market, where beginning-of-period assets holdings earn (1+it)Bt¡1
and (1 + id
t)Dt¡1 and the household can adjust its portfolio such that assets holdings are
now equal to Bt and Dt. To acquire money, they carry over securities Bc
t to a …nancial
intermediary, which participates in repurchase agreements with the central bank. The amount







t ¸ 0: (1)
5The households’ accounts at the …nancial intermediary are further charged by the wage outlays of the
…nal goods producing …rms, which are owned by the households.
3The discount (repo) rate, which equals the gross interest rate on government bonds 1+it,i s
set by the central bank. The household then enters the goods market. When goods trading
has ended and taxes and pro…ts are transferred, cash is repurchased by the central bank in
exchange for the securities Bc
t less the seignorage it
1+itBc
t = itMt. It should be noted that the
opportunity costs of holding cash from one period to the other would not be lower than the
costs of repurchase agreements as long as the nominal interest rate on government bonds is
not higher than the one on private debt. As we will focus on this case in the remainder of this
paper, we can disregard the possibility of money accumulation by the households. In order
to introduce a meaningful role of open market operations, we introduce a legal restriction
on open market operations and assume that only securities issued by the government can be
used in repurchase agreements:
Bc
t · Bt: (2)
When private debt is also accepted as collateral in open market operations, money supply
would obviously become irrelevant. Households receive income from labor supply lt, interest
earnings from assets, and …rms’ pro…ts !t. The budget constraint, which is actually the
constraint for the asset market, is
At + Ptct + Pt¿t · (1 + id
t)At¡1 ¡ (id
t ¡ it)Bt¡1 ¡ itMt + Ptwtlt + Pt!t; (3)
where Pt denotes the aggregate price level, ct the consumption good, wt the real wage, and
¿t a lump-sum tax. The representative household holds an checkable account at the …nancial
intermediary. After goods are produced its labor income is credited on this account, while it
is charged for wage outlays of …rms which are owned by the households. Entering the goods
market, consumption expenditures are restricted by the following liquidity constraint:








The conventional cash-in-advance constraint is augmented by allowing for checkable accounts
to be accepted as a means of payment (see the term in round brackets in 4). Hence, an indi-
vidual labor income, which exceeds the average wage payments of …nal goods producing …rms
indexed with i 2 (0;1), leads to an relaxation of the cash constraint (4). This assumption,
which is adopted from Jeanne (1998), is introduced to avoid the cash-credit good distortion
between consumption and leisure and, thus, to simplify the analysis and to facilitate com-
parisons with related studies. Obviously, we obtain a standard cash-in-advance speci…cation




¯tu(ct;l t); with 0 <¯<1; (5)
where ¯ denotes the subjective discount factor and E0 the expectation operator conditional
on the information in period 0. Regarding the instantaneous utility function u(ct;l t),w e
4state the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 The utility function u(ct;l t),w i t hu : R2
++ ! R,i sa s s u m e dt ob es t r i c t l y
increasing in consumption c, strictly decreasing in labor l, strictly concave, twice continuously
di¤erentiable with respect to both arguments, satis…es the usual Inada conditions, and is
additively separable.
We assume that the household internalizes that its access to money is restricted by their












t+v)¡1 ¸ 0, the liquidity constraint (4) and
the open market constraint (6) for a given initial value A0, leads to the following …rst order
conditions for consumption, leisure, private debt, government bonds and money:
























Ãt =it¸t +( 1+it)´t; (11)
Ãt(mt + wt(lt ¡ Lt) ¡ ct)=0;Ã t ¸ 0;m t + wt(lt ¡ Lt) ¡ ct ¸ 0; (12)
´t(bt ¡ mt(1 + it))=0;´ t ¸ 0;b t ¡ mt(1 + it) ¸ 0; (13)
where ¸t, Ãt,a n d´t denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the asset market constraint (3), on
the goods market constraint (4), and on the money market constraint (6), respectively. From
(10) and (13) it can immediately be seen that a positive value for the spread id
t+1 ¡ it+1
leads to a binding open market constraint constraint. The conditions (11) and (12) further
imply that the cash-in-advance constraint is binding if the nominal interest rate exceeds zero
(it > 0). When open market operations are not legally restricted by (2), the liquidity value
for government bonds is zero (´t =0) it = id
t) and the …rst order conditions change to









and (8) and (12). In the optimum the budget constraint (3) must hold with equality and the
no-Ponzi-game condition turns into a transversality condition providing a terminal condition






6This restriction becomes irrelevant when private debt is also accepted as a collateral for money.
5Production sector The …nal consumption good is an aggregate of di¤erentiated goods
produced by monopolistically competitive …rms indexed with i 2 (0;1). The aggregator of








it di; with ²>1, where yt is the number
of units of the …nal good, yit the amount produced by …rm i,a n d² the constant elasticity
of substitution between these di¤erentiated goods. Let Pit and Pt denote the price of good
i set by …rm i and the price index for the …nal good. The demand for each di¤erentiated
good is yit =( Pit=Pt)




it di.A … r m i produces good yi employing
a technology which is linear in labor: yit = lit. We introduce a nominal stickiness in form
of staggered price setting as developed by Calvo (1983). Each period …rms may reset their
prices with the probability 1¡Á independent of the time elapsed since the last price setting.
The fraction Á of …rms are assumed to adjust their previous period’s prices according to the
following simple rule: Pit = ¼Pit¡1. The log-linearized version of this rule and of the optimal
condition for the price e Pit of …rms, who are allowed to reset their prices, can be shown to
lead to the following aggregate supply constraint (see, e.g., Yun, 1996)
b ¼t = Âc mct + ¯Etb ¼t+1; with Â ´ (1 ¡ Á)(1¡ ¯Á)Á¡1; (16)
which is most commonly applied in the recent business cycle literature. Note that b x denotes
the percent deviation from the steady state value x : b x =l o g ( xt) ¡ log(x) and mct the real
marginal costs. Labor demand in the symmetric equilibrium satis…es
wt = mct: (17)
Public sector The public sector consists of a …scal and a monetary authority. The
monetary authority supplies money Mt in open market operations in exchange for bonds
Bc
t =( 1+it)Mt. It sets the exchange rate, i.e., the gross nominal interest rate Rt ´ 1+it,
according to the following state contingent interest rate rule
Rt = ½(¼t;" r
t); with ½(¼t;" r
t) ¸ 1 and @½=@¼t ¸ 0: (18)
where the innovation "r
t has an expected value of zero and is serially uncorrelated. We assume
that the steady state condition on the nominal interest rate has a solution for ½(¼;0) > 1.7
Furthermore, the realizations of "r are restricted to be small enough such that the gross
interest rate always exceeds one in the neighborhood of the steady state.
Open market operations are conducted in form of repurchase agreements, i.e., swaps of
the ownership over securities Bc
t at the rate it. Hence, the central bank earns Bc
t ¡Mt = itMt
from repurchase agreements such that its budget is given by itMt = Pt¿c
t, where ¿c
t denotes
the transfer to the …scal authority. The latter issues risk free one period bonds earning the
nominal interest rate it, collects lump-sum taxes ¿t from the households, receives transfers






t), where the in‡ation elasticity ½¼ governs
the reactiveness of the interest rate policy and ½ guarantees ½¼
½¼ > 1.
6¿c from the monetary authority and purchases the amount g of the …nal good
Ptgt +(1+it)Bt¡1 = Bt + Pt¿c
t + Pt¿t: (19)
The …scal policy regime is characterized by the following simple rule which relates expendi-
tures g and debt obligations to their tax receipts and transfers from the central bank:
·tPtgt + itBt¡1 = Pt(¿t + ¿c
t): (20)
The policy variable ·t decides on the portion of government expenditures not covered by
public debt. By setting ·t equal to one the …scal authority, for example, chooses a balanced
budget policy. A lower value for the ’…scal stance’ ·t raises the debt …nanced fraction of
government expenditures such that ·t can be interpreted as a measure of …scal responsiveness.
To facilitate an analysis of unexpected changes in the …scal stance, we assume that it follows
the stochastic process
log·t =l o g· + "·
t ; with · 2 (0;1); (21)
where "·
t has an expected value of zero and is serially uncorrelated.8 Similarly, government
expenditures are assumed to be exogenous and to follow a …rst order autoregressive process,
loggt =l o gg + "
g
t; with g 2 (0;c); (22)
where the shock "
g
t has an expected value of zero and is serially uncorrelated. It should be
noted that public consumption is assumed not to exceed private consumption in the long-
run (see 22). Using the …scal policy rule (20), and the budget constraint (19) leads to the
following consolidated public sector budget constraint
Bt =( 1¡ ·t)Ptgt + Bt¡1: (23)
Given that the sequences of ·t and gt are, by (21) and (22), stationary, it can immediately
be seen from (23) that our speci…cation of the public sector implies that public debt B
grows asymptotically with a rate smaller than the gross nominal interest rate (1 <R t). The
reason is that our …scal policy rule (20) demands that all debt interest payments are …nanced





v=1(1 + it+v)¡1 =0is always satis…ed, such that our speci…cation of public
policy is Ricardian (see Woodford 2002) or ’well posed’ (see Buiter, 2002).
Rational expectations equilibrium Given that the initial price level P0 as well as the
initial stock of nominal …nancial wealth A0 is given, real …nancial wealth a0 = A0=P0 is
a predetermined variable. In equilibrium private debt is equal to zero dt =0such that
households’ …nancial wealth solely consists of government bonds at = bt. As we will disregard
8Note that ·t is not restricted to lie between zero and one.
7the case where the cash constraint is not binding (Rt =1 ), we de…ne the equilibrium of our
model only for the case where Rt > 1.
De…nition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium of the model with Rt > 1 is a set of se-
quences f¸t;´ t;c t;l t;y t;¼ t;m c t;w t;a t;m t;b c
t;b t;R d
t ´ 1+id
t;R t ´ 1+it;g t;· tg1
t=0







bt if ´t > 0
ctRt if ´t =0
; (26)
the aggregate production function, yt = lt, and the …rms’ …rst order conditions (16) and (17),
the consolidated public sector budget constraint (23), the monetary policy rule (18), and the
law of motion for the …scal stance ·t (21) and for government expenditures (22), market
clearance, such that the aggregate resource constraint (yt = ct + gt)a n dat = bt holds, for a
given initial condition a0 and the terminal condition (15).
3 Fundamental properties
In this section we present fundamental properties of the model, which will be used for the
analysis of cyclical e¤ects of monetary and …scal policy in the subsequent section. We derive
a linear version of the model by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions listed in de…nition 1
at the steady state. The complete set of steady state conditions can be found in appendix 6.1.
For the model ’s local dynamics and for the interaction between monetary and …scal policy is
it crucial whether the open market constraint is binding or not. However, this distinction is
irrelevant for the long-run relation between the in‡ation, and the growth rate of money and
real output, as both versions are consistent with McCandless and Weber’s (1995) ’monetary
facts’. The steady state conditions (see appendix 6.1), particularly imply that, in contrast
to overlapping generation models (see, e.g., Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000), real government
liabilities and, thus, the rate of in‡ation do not a¤ect private consumption in the long run
equilibrium.
When open market operations are irrelevant Rather than to apply a comprehensive
approach allowing for a joint analysis of both versions, we treat them separately for simplicity.
We are primarily interested in the dynamic behavior of the log-linear approximation to the
model in a small neighborhood of a steady state where the open market constraint is binding.
However, before we turn to the latter case, we start with a brief characterization of the log-
linearized version where assets traded in open market operations are not restricted by (2). In
this case, open market operations are irrelevant for households’ optimal decisions (´t =0 ),
as can be seen from (14). As a consequence, the nominal interest rates on government bonds
and private debt are identical and the amount of securities Bc
t can be recursively determined
by bc
t = ctRt (see 24-26). Given that the policy variable ·t, which governs the ratio of tax to
debt …nancing, exclusively enters the government budget constraint (23) and real wealth does
8not a¤ect the remaining variables,9 it can immediately be concluded that ·t is irrelevant for
the equilibrium sequences of the remaining variables. Hence, Ricardian equivalence holds in
this version, as in the majority of general equilibrium business cycle models with lump-sum
taxes. This result and a simpli…ed representation of the rational expectations equilibrium is
presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the open market operations are irrelevant (´t =0 ). Then Ri-
cardian equivalence holds and the rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linear approxi-
mation to the model at the steady state can be reduced to a set of sequences {b ct; b ¼t; b Rt; b at}1
t=0
satisfying
¾b ct =¾Etb ct+1 ¡ b Rt + Etb ¼t+1; (27)
b ¼t =¯Etb ¼t+1 + °1b ct + °2"
g
t; (28)
b Rt =½¼b ¼t + "r
t; (29)
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together with the transversality condition and a given initial value for real wealth a0.
Proof. Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions given in de…nition 1 for ´t =0and sim-
plifying gives (27)-(30). The equilibrium sequences for b ct, b ¼t,a n db Rt are determined by
(27)-(29), while the equilibrium sequence for b at results from (30). Ricardian equivalence fol-
lows immediately from the fact that the ratio of de…cit …nanced expenditures (· and "·
t )d o e s
not enter (27)-(29). Q.E.D.
The three equations (27)-(29) solely determine the equilibrium sequences of consumption,
in‡ation, the nominal interest rate, and government expenditures. Real …nancial wealth at,
which is a predetermined variable, does not a¤ect these variables and can be recursively
determined by (30) for given equilibrium sequences of in‡ation, government expenditures,
and shocks "·
t . The model consisting of the subset (27)-(29) is isomorphic with the consensus
monetary business cycle model, the so-called New Keynesian model (see, e.g., Clarida et al.,
1999, or Woodford, 2001), with government expenditures. Given that the …scal stance ·t
only matters for the evolution of real …nancial wealth such that public …nancing is irrelevant
for the e¤ects of monetary and government spending shocks, and that the transmission of
the latter can be found in the literature (see Canzoneri et al., 2002a, and Linnemann and
Schabert, 2003), we abstain from a further investigation of this version.
When open market operations matter Now we turn to the version where households
internalize that their access to money is restricted by the open market constraint (6). The
corresponding Lagrange multiplier is larger than zero whenever the spread between the nomi-
nal interest rates on private debt and on government bonds is expected to be positive (see 10).
When the spread is equal to zero, the model reduces to the one presented in proposition 1.
9This property relates to the ’real bond indeterminacy’ in standard models (see Canzoneri and Diba, 2000).
9Given that we are interested in the model’s local dynamics, it is su¢cient for our purpose to
examine the case where the steady state exhibits a positive spread. The following proposition
presents the particular steady state restriction.
Proposition 2 The open market constraint is binding in the steady state (´>0)i fa n do n l y
if the central bank sets the nominal interest rate on government bonds such that
R<R; with R ´ ¯¡1 +( 1¡ ·)g=c: (31)
Proof. Suppose that R ¸ R and that the open market constraint is binding (´>0)s u c h
that a = Rc. Using the steady state conditions on Rd and on ¼ (see appendix 6.1), R ¸ R




[1 ¡ (1 ¡ ·)g=(Rc)]. Given that the term in the
square brackets is strictly positive and that R cannot exceed Rd, the spread must be equal
to zero (Rd = R). The steady state condition ´Rd=¸ = Rd ¡ R then demands ´ =0 ,w h i c h
contradicts the initial assumption implying R<R , ´>0. Q.E.D.




t is su¢ciently small such that,
…rst, the log-linearization at the steady state with R<R is a suitable approximation of the
non-linear model and that, second, the nominal interest rate Rd
t always exceeds Rt. Hence,
open market operations matter (´t > 0) and private consumption is determined by ct = at=Rt
(see 24-26). The consumption Euler equation, ¾b ct = ¾Etb ct+1¡ b Rd
t +Etb ¼t+1,i sn o wi r r e l e v a n t
for the determination of the equilibrium sequences of consumption, in‡ation, and real wealth.
It only serves as an equilibrium condition which can recursively be applied to determine the
equilibrium sequence for the interest rate on private debt. The following proposition presents
the log-linearized model.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the open market constraint is binding (´t > 0). Then the
rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linear approximation to the model at the steady
state with R<R is a set of sequences {b ct; b ¼t; b Rt; b at}1
t=0 satisfying (29) and
b ct =b at ¡ b Rt (32)
b ¼t =¯Etb ¼t+1 + °1b at ¡ °1 b Rt + °2"
g
t (33)










together with the transversality condition and a given initial value for real wealth a0.
Proof. Given that R<R, the spread is positive such that ´>0 and, thus, ´t > 0 holds at
the steady state. Hence, in addition to the conditions (28)-(30), the equality b ct = b at ¡ b Rt,
which results from linearizing and simplifying (24)-(26) and bt = at,m u s tb es a t i s … e di n
equilibrium. Eliminating b ct in (28) then gives (33). Q.E.D.
As can be seen from proposition 3, real wealth b at¡1 constitutes a relevant endogenous state
variable of the model, while the rate of in‡ation and the nominal interest rate can jump. The
equilibrium path of the model is therefore stable and unique (saddlepoint stable) if there is
exactly one eigenvalue lying inside the unit circle. It turns out that the assumptions made
in the previous section ensure real determinacy. This result is summarized in the following
proposition.
10Proposition 4 Suppose that the open market constraint is binding (´t > 0). Then the model
exhibits a unique rational expectations equilibrium path converging to the steady state.






















For the analysis of the stability conditions we examine the characteristic polynomial of
M¡1




¼¯ . We want to show that exactly one
root of F(X) lies between zero and one. For this we examine F(0),w h i c hi ss t r i c t l yp o s i t i v e :
F(0) =
1+°1½¼
¯¼ > 0.F o r X =1 , we obtain F(1) = ¡ 1
¯¼ (°1 +( ¼ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¯ + °1½¼)) < 0
given that ¼ ¸ 1. Hence, one root of F(X) lies between zero and one, whereas the other root
exceeds one. Q.E.D.
Hence, stability and uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium is guaranteed. It
should, however, be noted that the speci…c choice of the …scal policy rule (20) is responsible for
this results. In particular, when debt obligations are not completely tax …nanced, as implied
by the …scal policy rule (20), debt-interest spirals, as discussed in Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2000), can occur for an aggressive interest rate setting. Remarkably, the Taylor principle
(½¼ > 1) which is necessary in standard New Keynesian models for real determinacy (see
Clarida et al., 1999, or Woodford 2001), is irrelevant in this model.
4 Monetary and …scal policy interaction
In this section we examine the responses to monetary and …scal policy shocks for the version
with a binding open market constraint (´t > 0) described in proposition 3. Given the state
space solution of the model, which is presented in the …rst part of this section, we investigate
the impulse responses and changes thereof with respect to variations of policy parameter. In
particular, we are interested in how …scal policy a¤ects the model’s responses to a monetary
policy shock and vice versa. We abstain from presenting the policy e¤ects in the model’s
version where open market operations are irrelevant, as it lacks any interaction of monetary
policy and public …nancing (see proposition 1), while the e¤ects of …scal policy shocks herein
can be found in the literature (see, e.g., Linnemann and Schabert, 2003).






t), the state space representation of the model in a; ¼,a n dg reads










As shown in proposition 4, the coe¢cient ±a i st h es i n g l es t a b l ee i g e n v a l u eo ft h em o d e l
and lies between zero and one (0 <± a < 1). The remaining coe¢cients in (35)-(36), which
are derived by applying the method of undetermined coe¢cients (see, e.g., Uhlig, 1999), are
11presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The state space representation (35)-(36) of the model with ´t > 0 is characterized
by coe¢cients ±i with i 2f a; ag; ar; a·; ¼a; ¼g; ¼r; ¼·g satisfying
1. 0 <± a = 1
2¯¼(®1 ¡ ®
1=2
2 ) < 1=¼ and 0 <± ¼a =1¡ ±a¼<1;
2. ±ag =[ °3¼(1 ¡·)
g
a ¡ °2]=°4 Q 0 and ±¼g = ¼[(¯ (1 ¡ ±a¼)+°1)(1¡·)
g
a + °2]=°4 > 0,
3. ±ar = °1=°4 > 0 and ±¼r = ¡°1¼=°4 < 0;
4. ±a· = ¡·¼
g
a°3=°4 < 0 and ±¼· = ¡·¼
g
a[°1 + ¯(1 ¡ ±a¼)]=°4 < 0,
with ®1 ´ ¼°3 + ¯ + °1 > 1, ®2 ´ ®2
1 ¡ 4¯¼°3 > 0, °3 ´ 1+°1½¼ > 1, and °4 ´
°3¼ + ¯ (1 ¡ ±a¼)+°1 > 1:
Proof. See appendix 6.2.
Once the coe¢cients are identi…ed, we can easily examine the e¤ects of monetary and …scal
policy shocks. Rather than restricting the attention on the cyclical behavior of in‡ation and
real wealth, we will also examine the responses of consumption and output. The correspond-
ing coe¢cients are derived from b ct = b at ¡ b Rt = b at ¡ ½¼b ¼t ¡ "r






Interest rate shocks We start our policy analysis with the case where a nominal interest
rate shock hits the economy in period s, while the realizations of the remaining stochastic
variables are equal to zero ("
g
t = "·
t =08t). In particular, we assume that the sequence
of interest rate rule innovations "r satis…es "r
s > 0 and "r
t =08t : t 6= s. The following
proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 5 Ap o s i t i v ei n n o v a t i o nt ot h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l ei np e r i o ds leads to a decline
in in‡ation (@b ¼s=@"r
s < 0), a rise in real wealth (@b as=@"r
s = ±ar > 0), and to a decline in
consumption and output (@b cs=@"r
s;@ b ys=@"r
s < 0).
Proof. The …rst two claims made in the proposition immediately follow from @b ¼s=@"r
s =
±¼r < 0 and @b as=@"r
s = ±ar < 0 (see in part 3 of lemma 1). As b ct = b at ¡ ½¼b ¼t ¡ "r
t holds
in equilibrium, the impact e¤ect on consumption is given by @b cs=@"r
s = ±ar ¡ ½¼±¼r ¡ 1.
Applying the results in part 3 of lemma 1, we obtain @b cs=@"r
s =( °1 + ½¼°1¼ ¡ °4)=°4 =
¡(¼ + ¯ (1 ¡ ±a¼))=°4 < 0 and, thus, @b ys=@"r
s = c
c+g@b cs=@"r
s < 0: Q.E.D.
As summarized in proposition 5, an unanticipated rise in the nominal interest rate causes
a decline in in‡ation, consumption, and, therefore, in output. These responses qualitatively
accord to the predictions of the standard New Keynesian model and are consistent with
common priors about monetary policy e¤ects. The model further predicts that real wealth
rises due to a decline in the price level and eases, ceteris paribus, households’ access to money.
Subsequent to the impact period s, real wealth, which evolves sluggishly according to (34),
is temporarily higher than in the long-run equilibrium which is responsible for a smooth
recovery of consumption and in‡ation. In contrast to the standard New Keynesian model,
12which exhibits no endogenous state variable and, thus, lacks any propagation mechanism, our
model predicts that the endogenous variables do not immediately return to the steady state
when a transitory monetary policy shock disappears. The persistence of monetary policy
e¤ects is governed by the stable eigenvalue ±a, which depends – inter alia – on the parameter
· and ½¼ describing the reactiveness of …scal and monetary policy. While a rise in the …scal
stance · raises the eigenvalue ±a, a higher in‡ation elasticity ½¼ leads to the opposite e¤ect.
These …ndings are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The eigenvalue ±a and, therefore, the persistence of impulse responses
1. increases with the …scal responsiveness · (@±a=@· > 0)a n d
2. decreases with the in‡ation elasticity ½¼ (@±a=@½¼ < 0).
Proof. To establish the …rst claim, we use that · a¤ects the solution only via its negative




2 ) (see part 1 of lemma 1). Applying the de…nitions for ®1 and ®2, the partial
derivative of the eigenvalue with respect to in‡ation is @±a=@¼ =[ ¼°3®3¡(®1¡®
1=2
2 )]=(2¯¼2);
with ®3 ´ 1 ¡ ®
¡1=2
2 (®1 ¡ 2¯) < 0.G i v e n t h a t (®1 ¡ ®
1=2
2 ) > 0 and that ®3 can easily be
shown to be negative, we can conclude that @±a=@¼ < 0and, thus, @±a=@· > 0. The partial
derivative of ±a with respect to the in‡ation elasticity ½¼ is further given by ±a=@½¼ =
°1®3=(2¯) < 0, which establishes the second claim. Q.E.D.
While the propagation of monetary policy shocks is often discussed in the literature, it is
obvious that changes in the eigenvalue ±a also a¤ect the persistence of other shocks e¤ects.
The reason for the …scal stance · to increase the persistence is due to the fact that a lower
mean value for the …scal stance · directly raises the steady state in‡ation rate. Inspecting
the linearized equilibrium condition (34) reveals that the inverse of the latter weights the
backward dependence of real wealth. Hence, whenever real wealth deviates from its steady
state value its recovery is, ceteris paribus, more pronounced for higher steady state in‡ation
rates. The e¤ect of the in‡ation elasticity ½¼ on persistence, which does not operate via
on changes in steady state values, can easily be understood for the current experiment of
a positive interest rate shock. For a higher in‡ation elasticity ½¼ the decline in in‡ation
triggered by the contractionary monetary policy shock causes the central bank to adjust the
nominal interest rate more strongly mitigating the initial interest rate hike. Hence, a higher
reactiveness of interest rate policy leads to a faster recovery to the long-run equilibrium in
the subsequent periods.
Government expenditure shocks We now turn to the experiment where a government
expenditure shock hits the economy in period s ("
g
s > 0, "
g




8t). The solutions for the coe¢cients presented in lemma 1 reveal that in‡ation always rises
in response to a positive innovation to government expenditures, while the response of output
depends on the reactiveness of the interest rate rule. The result is summarized in the following
proposition.
13Proposition 7 A positive government expenditure shock in period s leads to a rise in
1. in‡ation (@b ¼s=@"
g
s > 0), and in
2. output (@b ys=@"
g
s > 0)i f ½¼ < ½¼1,w i t h ½¼1 ´ [¯(1 ¡ ±a¼)]¡1 > 1.
Proof. The …rst claim immediately follows from the sign restriction for ±¼g = @b ¼s=@"
g
s
given in part 2 of lemma 1. The impact multiplier on output is given by @b ys=@"
g











¼(1 ¡ ·) 1
R [1 ¡ ½¼¯ (1 ¡ ±a¼)] + ¼ + Â¾(1 + ½¼¼)+¯ (1 ¡ ±a¼)
¤
. Hence, for a
rise in b yt a moderate in‡ation elasticity ½¼ < [¯(1 ¡ ±a¼)]¡1 is su¢cient, where the upper
b o u n di ss t r i c t l yl a r g e rt h a no n eg i v e nt h a t¯<1 and ±a¼<1. Q.E.D.
A comparison with Linnemann and Schabert (2003) reveals that both results presented in
proposition 7, are consistent with the …ndings on …scal policy e¤ects in a standard New
Keynesian model, i.e., in the version presented in proposition 1 with irrelevant open market
operations. The rise in government consumption leads to a price pressure by (33) and tends
to raise aggregate demand. However, the rise in the price level has an adverse e¤ect on
aggregate demand when the central bank endogenously responds to higher in‡ation by raising
the nominal interest rate. Hence, a highly aggressive monetary policy reaction (½¼ > ½¼1)
can cause a decline in aggregate demand in response to a government expenditure shock.
This result immediately leads to the probably most interesting e¤ect of government spend-
ing shocks, i.e., the response of private consumption. Given that consumption rises with real
…nancial wealth and declines with the nominal interest rate (see 32), a positive consumption
response obviously requires that prices are not too ‡exible. Hence, the sign of the impact
multiplier on consumption does not only to depend on the monetary stance ½¼,b u ta l s o
hinges on the degree of price rigidity Â and on the …scal reactiveness ·.W h e ng o v e r n m e n t
expenditures are highly debt …nanced and prices are not too ‡exible, real wealth can rise
such that households can a¤ord to consume more. Hence, a rise in real wealth requires prices
to be su¢ciently rigid (low Â) and a …scal stance not to be too reactive (low ·), while a rise
in private consumption further demands a moderately reactive interest rate policy (low ½¼).
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 8 Suppose that prices are su¢ciently rigid Â · Â,w i t hÂ ´ ¯(c + g)=(#c).
Then a positive innovation to government expenditures in period s l e a d st oar i s ei n
1. real wealth (@b as=@"
g
s > 0)i f ·<·1,w i t h ·1 2 (0;1),a n d i n
2. consumption (@b cs=@"
g
s > 0)i f ·<·2,w i t h ·2 2 (0;·1) and ½¼ < ½¼2
with ·1 ´ 1 ¡
°2c=(g¯)
1+°1½¼ , ·2 ´ 1 ¡
°2c(1+½¼)=(g¯)
1¡½¼[¯(1¡±a¼)+°2], and ½¼2 ´
1¡c°2=(g¯)
¯(1¡±a¼)+°2[1+c=(g¯)] > 0.
14Proof. To establish the …rst claim, we consider that @b as=@"
g
s = ±ag =[
°3(1¡·)
Rc=g¡(1¡·) ¡ °2]=°4.
Using that R is assumed to exceed R (see proposition 2 and 3), we obtain ·<·1 · 1 as a
su¢cient condition for ±ag > 0. To establish the second claim, suppose that ½¼ < f ½¼,w i t h
f ½¼ ´ [¯(1 ¡ ±a¼)+°2]¡1. Using the upper bound R and ¼¡1 =1¡ (1 ¡ ·)
g
cR, it can easily
be shown that @b cs=@"
g




a [1 ¡ ½¼¯ (1 ¡ ±a¼)] ¡ (1 + ½¼¼)°2
¤
=°4 is positive
in this case if but not only if ·<·2.F u r t h e r ,½¼ < ½¼2 (< f ½¼)e n s u r e st h a t0 · ·2 · ·1,
while Â · ¯(c + g)=(#c) guarantees that ·1 and ½¼2 are non-negative. Q.E.D.
The result presented in the second part of proposition 8 is, in particular, remarkable as
several empirical studies (see, e.g., Fatas and Mihov, 2001, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002)
…nd that private consumption rises in response an …scal expansion. While standard business
cycle theory fails to reproduce the rise in private consumption (see, e.g., Canzoneri et al.,
2002a, or, Linnemann and Schabert, 2003). As shown by Baxter and King (1993), in a
neoclassical-style business cycle model government expenditures induce households to reduce
leisure (to raise labor supply) by intertemporal substitution, which is accompanied by an
increased willingness to postpone private consumption. In contrast, the novel wealth e¤ect in
our model has in fact the potential to solve this ’puzzle’ when prices are su¢ciently rigid.10
The fundamental di¤erence is that the response of private consumption is determined by the
response of real wealth and of the nominal interest rate (see 32), whereas the consumption
Euler equation, which governs the consumption response in a standard model, just residually
determines the nominal interest rate on private debt Rd
t. The results presented in proposition
7 and 8 further provide a rationale for responses to government expenditure shocks hardly
being robust for di¤erent countries and over time (see, e.g., Perotti, 2002).
Temporary …scal consolidation In this subsection we check for the e¤ects of shock to
the parameter · which governs the …scal stance. In particular, we consider a positive ·s shock
("·
s > 0, "·
t =08t : t 6= s,a n d"
g
t = "r
t =08t), which can be interpreted as a temporary
…scal consolidation. Obviously, this policy experiment emphasizes the primary di¤erence to a
conventional business cycle models. Given that the latter are regularly characterized by the
validity of Ricardian equivalence (see proposition 1), a switch from de…cit to tax …nancing
has no further impact on the allocation in these models. This result is clearly at odds with
recent empirical evidence of Mountford and Uhlig (2002), showing that the most signi…cant
…scal stimulus is brought about a de…cit …nanced tax cuts. Our model, in fact, allows to
reproduce this result (·t #)yt ") when open market operations are relevant. The following
proposition summarizes the e¤ects a temporary …scal consolidation.
Proposition 9 An unanticipated and temporary …scal consolidation in period s leads to a
decline in
1. in‡ation (@b ¼s=@"·
s < 0) and real …nancial wealth (@b as=@"·
s < 0), and in
10Note that the constraint Â · Â is hardly restrictive for a conventional set of parameter values (e.g.,
¾ = # =2 ;¯=0 :99;g = y=0 :2;Á=0 :8, ) Â =0 :052 and Â =0 :61875).
152. consumption and output (@b cs=@"·
s;@ b ys=@"·
s < 0)i fa n do n l yi f ½¼ < ½¼1.
Proof. The claims made in the …rst part immediately follow from @b ¼s=@"·
s = ±¼· < 0 and
@b as=@"·








Rc[1 ¡ ½¼¯(1 ¡ ±a¼)]=°4, which is strictly positive for ½¼ < [¯(1 ¡ ±a¼)]
¡1 = ½¼1,w i t h
½¼1 > 1 (see proposition 7). Q.E.D.
A rise in …scal responsiveness ·t is, by (23), associated with a decline in nominal government
bonds outstanding, accompanied by a decline in in‡ation and real government debt given
that prices are sticky. Thus, consumption and output tends, by (32), to decline as long as
interest rate policy is not too reactive.. For high in‡ation elasticities (½¼ > ½¼1), the decline
in in‡ation can cause the central bank to lower the nominal interest rate in an extreme way
such that households might be willing to increase consumption expenditures, even though
real wealth declines. In other words, a de…cit …nanced tax cut can stimulate real activity
when the reactiveness of monetary policy is moderate (½¼ < ½¼1).
5C o n c l u s i o n
We developed a simple business cycle model where the central bank supplies money via re-
purchase agreements and sets the repo rate. We allow for a non-negligible role of open market
operations by assuming that private debt is not accepted as a collateral for money. When
households internalize this restriction, demand for government bonds depends on the mone-
tary policy stance if private debt earn a higher interest. Otherwise, the model is isomorphic
to the conventional New Keynesian model. While the latter has proven is usefulness for
monetary policy analysis, it is hardly able to explain why government expenditures or de…cit
…nanced tax cut are found to be able to stimulate private consumption, or why public debt
matters for monetary policy. Obviously, these shortcomings are primarily founded in the
validity of Ricardian equivalence.
When agents care about open market operations, Ricardian equivalence breaks down
as government bonds provide liquidity services. Real …nancial wealth serves as a relevant
predetermined state variable, which stabilizes the model’s dynamics such that interest rate
policy is not restricted by the requirements for real determinacy. Further, the structural
part of monetary and …scal policy is shown to a¤ect the stable eigenvalue and, thus, the
persistence of impulse responses. Interest rate shock e¤ects are consistent with common
priors, while government expenditure and tax cut shock are able to stimulate output as well
as private consumption when the central bank is not too reactive. Otherwise, interest rate
adjustments triggered by higher in‡ation can lead to a monetary tightening which prevails
over expansionary …scal policy impulses. Hence, our novel mechanism for …scal and monetary
policy to interact via liquidity services of government bonds, is able to generate policy e¤ects
qualitatively consistent with recent empirical …ndings.
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6.1 Steady state






; c = m; Rd =
¼
¯


















while g and · are exogenously determined by …scal policy (see 21 and 22), and R is determined
by (18) if ´>0,o rb yR = Rd if ´ =0 .
6.2 Proof of lemma 1
The equilibrium conditions of the model with a binding open market constraint given in
p r o p o s i t i o n3c a nb er e d u c e dt o










¯Etb ¼t+1 + °1b at = °3b ¼t ¡ °2"
g
t + °1"r
t; with °3 ´ 1+°1½¼ > 1 (38)
Replacing the endogenous variables in (37) and (38) by using the general solution form given
by (35)-(36), leads to the following conditions for the undetermined coe¢cients
±a ¡ ¼¡1 + ¼¡1±¼a =0;° 3±¼a ¡ ¯±¼a±a ¡ °1±a =0 ; (39)
±ar + ¼¡1±¼r =0;¯ ± ¼a±ar + °1±ar ¡ °1 ¡ °3±¼r =0 ; (40)
(1 ¡ ·)g=a¡ ¼¡1±¼g ¡ ±ag =0;¯ ± ¼a±ag ¡ °3±¼g + °1±ag + °2 =0 ; (41)
¡±a· ¡ ¼¡1°¼· ¡ ·g=a=0;° 1±a· + ¯±¼a±a· ¡ °3±¼· =0 : (42)
Eliminating ±¼a in the two conditions given in (39), leads to the following quadratic equation
in eigenvalue ±a : ¯±2
a¼ ¡ (¼°3 + ¯ + °1)±a + °3 =0 . Exactly one root of this equation lies
between zero and one (see proposition 4), which is given by









< 1; with ®1 ´ ¼°3 + ¯ + °1 > 1:
We can, further, conclude from (39) that the coe¢cient ±¼a is strictly positive, ±¼a =1 ¡¼±a >
0,g i v e nt h a t¼±a can easily be shown to be smaller than one. Turning to the impact responses
to a monetary policy shock, the conditions in (40) immediately lead to the solutions for ±¼r
and ±ar given in part 3 of lemma 1. Rearranging the conditions in (41), gives the solution
for the coe¢cients ±¼g and ±ag presented in part 2 of lemma 1, which govern the e¤ects of
government spending shocks. The solution for remaining coe¢cients ±¼· and ±a· in part 4
of lemma 1, which refer to the responses to a …scal consolidation shock, immediately follow
from the conditions in (42) and ±¼a =1¡ ±a¼. Q.E.D.
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